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THE RIGHT TO REPUBLISH LIBEL:
NEUTRAL REPORTAGE AND THE REASONABLE READER
by
DAVID MCCRAW°
INTRODUCTION
For nearly a decade and a half, the neutral reportage privilege has been a
source of contradiction and confusion in the law of defamation. The doctrine was
first recognized in 1977, in Edwards v. National Audubon Society, Inc.,' when
the Second Circuit held that the U.S. Constitution protects a newspaper's
republication of defamatory accusations against a public figure in controversies
of public interest, even when the reporter knows that the accusations are false.2
The ruling stands in contrast both to the common law's long tradition of holding
the republisher of defamation equally liable with the originator of the defamation3
and to Supreme Court precedents holding that the First Amendment does not
protect media defendants who knowingly publish false and defamatory allega-
tions.4 Since then, the federal circuits and state courts have been unable to agree
either on whether the privilege exists as a matter of constitutional law5 or on the
extent of its protection.6 The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Edwards7 and
" Director of Journalism, Marist College, Poughkeepsie, N.Y., B.S.. University of Illinois; M.P.S., Cornell
University; J.D., Albany Law School. The author thanks Professor Steven Gottlieb of Albany Law School
for his assistance with earlier drafts of this Article.
1556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1002 (1977).
2 Id. at 120.
3 L. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION § 44 (1978). Over time, the common law did come to protect
republication of defamatory statements made as part of certain governmental proceedings under the
doctrine of fair report. See Note, Privilege to Republish Defamation, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1102 (1964).
The neutral reportage doctrine, in contrast, does not require that the statement be made in a governmental
context
' New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
' The Edwards holding has been rejected in Dickey v. Columbia Broadcast System, Inc., 583 F.2d 1221
(3d Cit. 1978); Tunney v. American Broadcasting Co., 109 Il. App. 3d 769, N.E.2d 86 (1982); McCall
v. Courier-Journal, 623 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 975 (1982); Postill v. Booth
Newspapers, 118 Mich. App. 608, 325 N.W.2d 511 (1982); Hogan v. Herald Co., 84 A.D.2d 470, 446
N.Y.S.2d 836, affd, 58 N.Y.2d 630, 444 N.E.2d 1002, 458 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1982).
It has been adopted in such cases as Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 881 F.2d 1426 (8th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1036 (1990), reh'g denied, 110 S. Ct 1312 (1990); Barry v. Time, Inc., 584 F.
Supp. 1110 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Huszar v. Gross, 468 So. 2d 512 (Fla. Dist CL App. 1985); J.V. Peters &
Co. v. Knight Ridder Co., 10 Media L.Rptr. 1576 (Ohio CL App. 1984); Burns v. Times Argus Ass'n,
Inc. 139 Vt 381, 430 A.2d 773 (Vt 1981).
'See, e.g., Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 639 .2d 54 (2d Cir. 1980); Dixson v. Newsweek, Inc.,
562 F.2d 626 (10th Cir. 1977); Barry v. Time, Inc., 584 F. Supp. 1110 (N.D. Cal. 1984); and infra notes
42-53 and accompanying text
434 U.S. 1002 (1977).
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has never ruled in a case in which the neutral reportage principle was directly
implicated!
In Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton,9 however, the
Supreme Court appeared to signal a willingness to resolve the uncertainty of the
doctrine. Justice Blackmun's concurrence specifically criticizes the defense's
strategic decision to drop its neutral reportage defense on appeal and suggests the
case would have offered the Court an appropriate opportunity to review the
doctrine."i It is perhaps significant as well that Justice Stevens, writing for the
majority, uses footnote 1 to summarize the trial court's decision on the neutral
reportage privilege even though the defense had not raised the issue for Supreme
Court review."1
Supreme Court resolution of the neutral reportage debate would provide
welcome clarity not only for the courts but for media decision-makers who must
shape their conduct to the current contours of First Amendment interpretation.
A review of lower court decisions shows that the neutral reportage privilege poses
two broad policy and conceptual problems. First, is the privilege incompatible
with Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,12 in which the Court held that the public or
private status of the plaintiff -- and not the newsworthiness of the subject matter
-- determines the constitutional protection afforded to the media?1 3
Second, is the privilege needed as a matter of public policy? In other words,
is any additional First Amendment protection beyond that allowed by New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan14 and its progeny required to provide the "uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open"' s debate envisioned by the first amendment? As with
any libel doctrine, that protection must be balanced against society's legitimate
interest in protecting individuals against reputational injury.
This Article argues for a reconsideration and redefinition of the neutral
reportage privilege. First, even if we accept Gertz's disapproval of newsworthi-
434 U.S. 1002 (1977).
a See Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 694 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
9 491 U.S. 657 (1989).
'0 "This strategic decision appears to have been unwise in light of the facts of this case....Were this court
to adopt the neutral reportage theory, the facts of this case arguably might fit within it" L at 694
(Blackmun. J., concurring).
"I d. at 660 n.1.
12 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
'3 Id. at 347-51.
14 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
" Id. at 270.
[Vol. 25:2
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ness as a criterion for First Amendment protection,16 a closer look at the neutral
reportage privilege reveals that, contrary to what many courts and commentators
have said, newsworthiness is not a necessary element of the privilege. Gertz is
thus inapplicable. Second, the more serious problems with the neutral reportage
privilege arise from its advocates' failure to define what constitutes "neutrality"--
in other words, to define what conduct by the reporter should legitimately give
rise to immunity from libel actions. What level of reportorial diligence is
required? What state of mind? What must be published in the story? No
coherent scheme for answering these questions appears in the decisions or
literature supporting the privilege.
But that failure need not be fatal to the doctrine. What is needed is a
"reader-centered" definition of neutral reportage -- one in which the courts look
at what readers could reasonably believe about the parties mentioned in the story,
based on the story itself. That approach, contrary to the modem trend in libel
litigation since Times v. Sullivan, focuses attention not on a reporter's conduct in
gathering information (e.g., did the reporter act with actual malice?) but on the
reporter's conduct in selecting and presenting information in the story. The
reader-centered approach returns the focus of libel litigation to the often-
overlooked question that should rightfully be at the center of the tort: Did the
story cause reputational harm?
The neutral reportage privilege strikes an appropriate balance between the
underlying policies of First Amendment liberty and society's legitimate interest
in protecting citizens' reputations. In so doing, it helps move libel jurisprudence
away from the flawed approach of Times v. Sullivan with its misplaced emphasis
on reportorial methods.
THE EVOLUTION OF THE NEUTRAL REPORTAGE PRIVILEGE
If the history of the neutral reportage privilege has been marked by
uncertainty and skepticism, much of the blame can be attributed to the uncertain
foundation laid for it in the Second Circuit's Edwards decision.17 In Edwards,
The New York Times reported that a publication put out by the National
Audubon Society had criticized certain scientists as "paid liars" for their support
of the chemical industry in the controversy over the pesticide DDT' 8 The
Audubon Society's publication mentioned no scientist by name in its editorial, but
'6 See infra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
7 See Note, Edwards v. National Audubon Society, Inc.: The Right to Print Known Falsehoods, 1979
U. ILL LF. 943, 965-66 (criticizing the decision for failing to show that it is a natural extension of
common law privilege); Bowles, Neutral Reportage as a Defense Against Republishing Libel, 11 COMM.
& THE LAW 3. 9 Mar. 1989 ("the lack of a uniformly accepted theoretical basis for the doctrine has
resulted in its uneven application").
" Edwards, 556 F.2d. at 117.
Fall, 1991]
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a Times reporter upon seeing the accusations phoned Audubon Society employees
and in time persuaded them to name some of the researchers in question.' 9 The
subsequent Times story contained the Audubon Society's accusation, the names
provided, and denials from the scientists, three of whom became the plaintiffs in
Edwards.20 At trial, the plaintiffs argued that the Times reporter had a duty to
attempt to determine whether the "paid liar" accusation was true and that he had
ignored information showing that at least two of the plaintiff scientists were not
employed by the pesticide industry in any capacity.2 '
The jury found that the Times had acted with actual malice, the level of fault
required by Times v. Sullivan for assessing libel damages in a case involving a
public-figure plaintiff.' On appeal, the Second Circuit, with Chief Judge Irving
R. Kaufman writing, held not only that the finding of actual malice was in
error23 but that, in the circumstances presented by the case, a constitutional
privilege of neutral republication protected the Times, even if actual malice was
to be conceded.24 The court held: "Succinctly stated, when a responsible,
prominent organization like the National Audubon Society makes serious charges
against a public figure, the First Amendment protects the accurate and disinterest-
ed reporting of those charges, regardless of the reporter's private views regarding
their validity., 25  The court went on to explain that "(t)he public interest in
being fully informed about controversies that often rage around sensitive issues
demands that the press be afforded the freedom to report such charges without
assuming responsibility for them. 26  Thus, the court offered constitutional
immunity from defamation action to publications that could show (1) the
allegations were made by a "responsible, prominent organization"; (2) the target
of the allegations was a public figure; (3) the republication was done accurately
and neutrally; and (4) the allegations were made in the context of a controversy
existing prior to publication.27
19 Id.
20Id. at 118.
2' Edwards v. National Audubon Society, Inc., 423 F. Supp. 516, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), rev'd, 556 F.2d
113 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1002 (1977). The reporter was also furnished with the names
of sources with whom he could have checked the allegation. Id. On appeal, the Second Circuit ruled the
evidence was insufficient to support a finding of actual malice. Edwards v. National Audubon Society,
Inc. 556 F.2d at 120. "We do not believe... that the scientists' responses to Devlin's [the reporter's]
inquiries could be found sufficient to warn Devlin of the probable falsity of the Society's charges." Id.
at 121.
2Id. at 119.
23 Id. at 120. See supra note 21.
A Id.
2 Id.
26 Id.
"2 Id. at 120-22.
[Vol. 25:2
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In effect, the court was adding a further layer of "breathing space" to the
Times v. Sullivan decision. In Times, the Supreme Court had held that a certain
amount of defamation that would otherwise be actionable must be tolerated in
state libel laws to give journalists the needed freedom to discuss public events
without undue fear of legal consequences if they err. 28  The Edwards court did
note, however, that a republisher who deliberately distorts the charges or who
"espouses or concurs in the charges "29 would not gain the benefit of the
privilege's protection."
From the beginning, the legal foundation of the Edwards ruling was suspect.
The court cited two cases as authority for the neutral reportage privilege: Time,
Inc. v. Pape3l and Medina v. Time, Inc.32 Neither case, in fact, speaks to the
issue of neutral reportage.33  Nor do the decisions attempt to justify the
privilege by explicit reference to the core values underlying the First Amendment,
the jurisprudential strategy used in Times v. Sullivan and other groundbreaking
decisions in the area of defamation.
The legal foundation of the neutral reportage privilege was further eroded
three years later by the Second Circuit itself in Cianci v. New Times Publishing
Co.' The court, this time with Judge Friendly writing, gave a restrained
endorsement to the Edwards ruling while acknowledging that the neutral reportage
2 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
29 Edwards v. National Audubon Society, Inc., 556 F.2d at 120.
30 Id.
" 401 U.S. 279 (1971), reh'g denied, 401 U.S. 1015 (1971).
32 439 F.2d 1129 (1st Cir. 1971).
33 See, e.g., Sowle, Defamation and the First Amendment: The Case for a Constitutional Privilege of Fair
Report, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469,501-508 (1979); Barry v. Time, Inc., 584 F. Supp. 1110, 1123 n.15 (N.D.
Cal. 1984). In Pape, Time accurately republished excerpts from a government report on police brutality
but failed to make clear that comments concerning police officer Pape were merely allegations. The Court
held that Time had not acted with actual malice, and thus the plaintiff had not made a prima facie case.
Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 285 (1971), reh'g denied, 401 U.S. 1015 (1971). In Medina, the Court
again found that Time had not acted with actual malice in republishing an allegation, this one arising from
charges that an officer in Vietnam had killed a Vietnamese child. Medina v. Time, Inc., 439 F.2d 1129,
1130 (1st Cir. 1971). The important distinction between these two cases and neutral reportage theory is
that in the latter the journalists are constitutionally protected even if they have acted with actual malice
(that is, they knew the allegations they were republishing were false). By finding an absence of malice,
the courts in Pope and Medina did not arrive at the issue of special privileges for republishers.
It should be noted as well that Pape is sometimes cited as creating a constitutional privilege of fair
report, but Sowle convincingly refutes that reading of the case. Sowle, supra, at 501. The fair report
privilege, which allows journalists to republish defamatory statements made in certain governmental
forums, has been long recognized at common law but has not been established as a matter of
constitutional law. See infra note 159 and accompanying text. The neutral reportage privilege differs
from fair report in that it would encompass certain defamatory statements made outside governmental
forums.
34639 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1980). The court held that a magazine's allegations that the mayor of Providence,
R.I., had bought off a witness against him in a rape case were not protected by the neutral reportage
privilege because the magazine endorsed the allegations as fact rather than remaining neutral. Id. at 69.
Fall, 1991]
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privilege went beyond both the established common law privilege of fair report--
which protected republication of defamatory statements only if they were made
as part of certain governmental proceedings 35 -- and the Supreme Court's First
Amendment interpretations -- which have held that in covering public figures
reporters enjoy constitutional protection from libel liability only when they act
without actual malice -- that is, their conduct does not exhibit a reckless disregard
for the truth or falsity of the information published.3 The neutral reportage
privilege, to the contrary, provides immunity even when the journalist knows the
allegations are false.
The court nonetheless maintained that Edwards was still good law in the
Second Circuit, but held that the contours of the neutral reportage privilege had
not yet been fully defined and that the limited scope of the privilege necessitated
a case-by-case examination of the facts.37
Thus, those courts choosing to accept the doctrine were left with the task of
spelling out its bounds as well as defending its constitutional status despite an
absence of Supreme Court precedent. Barry v. Time, Inc.3 offers one of the
most expansive and favorable judicial discussions of neutral reportage as a
constitutional doctrine. Barry involved a controversy surrounding a college
basketball coach. The court found that Edwards could be reconciled with existing
Supreme Court precedents and that, combined, they established a two-part
inquiry.39 The courts should first determine whether the plaintiff is a public
figure and whether the alleged defamation concerns his or her status as a public
figure, as required under the Supreme Court's decision in Gertz.40 After that,
the court said, Edwards merely required courts to take a second step and "assess
whether the defamer is a party to the controversy and whether the report is
accurate and neutral."4' If those requirements were met, the privilege applied.
Yet, even in those jurisdictions accepting the neutral reportage privilege,
courts have struggled with some of the specific language of Edwards. The judge
"Id. at 67. The common law privilege of fair report is intended to promote full coverage of trials and
legislative proceedings. Both the originator of the defamatory statement and the republisher are protected,
but at early common law the republisher was held to be absolutely liable for correctly reproducing the
statement. Sowles, supra note 33. Neutral reportage, as defined by Edwards, does not require that the
statement be made in a governmental context.
16 The Supreme Court has not recognized either the fair report or the neutral reportage privilege as
constitutional law, preferring to carve out protection for the press by defining the level of fault that must
be shown by the plaintiff under the First Amendment. Sowle, supra note 33. Public figure plaintiffs must
show that the defendant acted with actual malice. New York Times Co v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
7 Cianci, 639 F.2d at 68.
"584 F. Supp. 1110 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
'9 Id. at 1125.
40 Id. For a discussion of Gertz, see infra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
4' 584 F. Supp. at 1125.
[Vol. 25:2
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in Barry struck down the requirement that the accuser be an organization,4 2 and
he also took issue with the Second Circuit's requirement that the accuser be
"responsible" and "prominent., 43  Instead, he advocated that the courts drop any
requirements of accuser trustworthiness as elements of the privilege." Because
the statements were not being reported for their potential truthfulness, but to give
the public a full account of a controversy of legitimate public concern, the
significant question, according to Barry, is whether the defamatory allegations
were published neutrally. 5 Among the factors the court found relevant were the
publication of the plaintiff's denials and the revelations, also in the original story,
of the accuser's questionable credibility.' Other jurisdictions, contrary to Barry,
have held that trustworthiness is a central component in determining when the
privilege will be applicable.47
The courts have also split on other aspects of the Edwards test, including the
role of the reporter. At least one federal court has ruled that the privilege does
not extend to defamations arising from investigative reporting,48 while another
extended the privilege to statements made in an interview.49  The crucial
dividing line appeared to be whether a controvery existed prior to the reporter's
activities. 50 The implication is that a reporter who solicits the allegation no
longer can be considered a neutral observer for the purposes of the privilege.
NEUTRAL REPORTAGE UNDER ATrACK
While courts embracing the neutral reportage privilege have struggled to
define its contours, other jurisdictions have rejected it in toto.51 The result has
been conflicting laws not only state by state and circuit by circuit, but even within
42 id.
43 Id. at 1126.
"I d. ("A much more sensible approach is to extend the neutral reportage privilege to all republications
of serious charges made by one participant in an existing public controversy against another participant
in that controversy, regardless of the "trustworthiness" of the original defamer") (emphasis in original).
Id. The court justifies this extension by referring to the privilege's underlying public policy of "providing
the public with 'full information' about public controversies." Id. The accuser in Barry was a convicted
felon who failed a lie detector test. Id. at 1127.
45 Id.
46 Id.
41See, e.g.. Fogus v. Capital Cities Media, Inc., 111 Ri. App. 3d 1060, 444 N.E.2d 1100 (Dl. App. Ct.
1982) (holding that "unnamed youths" did not qualify as a "responsible, prominent organization" in a story
alleging police brutality); J.V. Peters & Co. v. Knight Ridder Co., 10 Media L. Rptr. 1576 (Ohio Ct. App.
1984) (holding that the state attorney general's office was a responsible organization).
" McManus v. Doubleday & Co., 513 F. Supp. 1383. 1391 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
4 Woods v. Evansville Press Co., 11 Media L. Rptr. 2201, 2204 (S.D. Ind. 1985), affid, 791 F.2d. 480
(7th Cir. 1986).
s0 Bowles, supra note 17, at 15.
5' See infra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
Fall, 1991]
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overlapping jurisdictions. Such is the case in New York, where the New York
Court of Appeals has rejected neutral reportage 52 but the Second Circuit
continues to recognize it in federal courts sitting within the state.53
Courts unwilling to embrace neutral reportage as constitutional law have
typically set forth two arguments:-4 First, they assert that the doctrine is
incompatible with the Supreme Court's holding in Gertz that the newsworthiness
of a story is not to be used in determining the level of First Amendment
protection afforded media defendants. 55  Such an objection is based on the
theory that the neutral reportage privilege applies only when the controversy being
publicized is newsworthy. Second, some courts have held that the neutral
reportage privilege is unnecessary because the protection provided by the Supreme
Court's "actual malice" standard in Times v. Sullivan and its progeny adequately
safeguards the media's First Amendment liberty.56
Times v. Sullivan and Gertz mark the beginning and end of the most
important 10-year period of Supreme Court litigation on the application of the
First Amendment to state libel statutes. In Times v. Sullivan,57 the Court
overturned its own precedents and the long history of defamation litigation by
ruling that libel fell within the purview of the First Amendment and was not
merely a matter of state law.58 In the view of the Court, state libel laws that
held media outlets responsible for all statements that were false and defamatory
unconstitutionally restrained the press by failing to give the media room to err in
32 Hogan v. Herald Co., 84 A.D.2d 470, 446 N.Y.S.2d 836 (1982), affd, 58 N.Y.2d 630, 444 N.E.2d
1002,458 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1982). The defendant newspaper, which reported allegations of criminal activity
on the part of a politician's son, argued that it should be protected from a libel claim by the neutral
reportage doctrine. The court ruled that the doctrine could not be squared with the Supreme Court's
decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), which held that the public or private status
of the defendants, and not the content of the allegedly defamatory publication, determines the extent of
first amendment protection provided to the press. Hogan, 84 A.D. 2d at 478, 446 N.Y.S. at 842.
- See Cantwell, The Controversy over Media Reporting of Public Disputes, 60 N.Y. ST. B.J. 22 (Apr.
1988). Neutral reportage makes for an interesting conflict-of-law issue. While the federal courts, under
the Erie doctrine, are to apply the substantive law of the state, the Second Circuit continues to rely on
Edwards as constitutional law that necessarily supercedes any state law. Id. at 24. The state courts, on
the other hand, refuse to acknowledge neutral reportage as constitutional doctrine in the absence of a
Supreme Court ruling. Id. at 24-25.
' Barry v. Time, Inc., 584 F. Supp. 1110, 1124 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
55 Id.
56 Id.
5' New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
"' See e.g., Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "the Central Meaning of the First Amendment,"
1964 SuP. Cr. REV. 191, for a discussion of the case's significance. The case originated from an
advertisement placed in The New York Times by civil rights activists. Times, 376 U.S. at 256. L.B.
Sullivan, a police commissioner in Montgomery, Ala., claimed the ad's discussion of police activities
during a civil rights demonstration libeled him. Id.
[Vol. 25:2
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their coverage of public affairs. 59 The Court's concern was that stringent libel
laws created self-censorship among members of the press and thus frustrated the
purposes of the First Amendment by restricting the flow of information to
society.' Thus, the Court held that in cases involving public officials as
plaintiffs, media defendants would not be found liable, even if the story was false
and defamatory, unless the defendants acted with actual malice -- i.e., the
defendants knew the story was false or displayed a reckless disregard for whether
it was true or false.61 The actual malice standard was later extended to public
figures as well. 2 Then in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,63 a plurality of the
Court held that the actual malice standard should not hinge on the public status
of the plaintiff but on whether the allegedly defamatory publication concerned a
matter of public interest"6 Under Rosenbloom, a plaintiff, whether public or
private, who was defamed in an article on a topic of public concern could not
prevail in a libel suit unless actual malice was shown, even if the story was both
false and harmful.65 The decision provided the broadest scope given to the First
Amendment in the area of defamation and clearly indicated the willingness of at
least part of the Court to tilt the balance of competing interests heavily toward
press liberty and away from protection of reputation.
Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc.,' which came only three years later, marked a
hasty retreat from Rosenbloom and a return to the original schema of public
plaintiffs (who must show actual malice) versus private plaintiffs (who will be
allowed to show a lesser degree of fault, such as negligence).67 The Court
expressed concern that the Rosenbloom approach lent insufficient reputational
protection to private individuals who had not voluntarily placed themselves before
the public68 and that the determination of whether a publication was of public
interest would pose great difficulty for the courts. 69 As expressed in a later case:
"Use of such subject-matter classifications to determine the extent of constitu-
tional protection afforded defamatory falsehoods may too often result in an
9 Times, 376 U.S. at 271-72 ("erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate" and must be protected to
provide needed "breathing space").
6 Id. at 276.
6' Id. at 279-80. In effect, the ruling meant that even a story that was false and defamatory would not
lead to compensation if the plaintiff was a public official who could not prove actual malice.
62 Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), reh'g denied, 389 U.S. 889 (1967) (overruled by
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974)).
6 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
6Id.
'
5 Id.
6Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
6 Id. at 346. The case was brought by a criminal defense lawyer who was labeled a communist in a
publication of the ultraconservative John Birch Society. Id. at 325-26.
"Id. at 344.
6Id. at 346.
Fall, 1991]
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improper balance between... the public's interest in an uninhibited press and its
equally compelling need for judicial redress of libelous utterances. 70
Because Edwards has been read to use the newsworthiness of the controver-
sy7' -- and not the status of the plaintiff as a public figure -- as the determina-
tive factor for applying the privilege, some courts have construed the Edwards
approach as using a subject-matter classification to determine First Amendment
protection, contrary to the ruling in Gertz.72 In the leading New York case, for
example, the court said: "The unequivocal holding of Gertz is that a publisher's
immunity is based upon the status of the plaintiff, not the subject matter of the
publication. Presumably, all publications of the news media are newsworthy.
They are not privileged, however, (unless they meet the standards of Times and
Gertz)."73
Other courts have questioned why protection beyond the actual malice
standard of Times is needed by the press.74 The Supreme Court in Times
intentionally placed a substantial burden on libel plaintiffs and, in effect,
recognized that defamation of many public figures should go uncompensated as
part of the price to be paid for an informed democracy. 75 Because of the broad
reach of Times and its progeny, in many cases (e.g., Edwards), neutral reportage
will simply be alternative grounds for finding for the defendant because plaintiff
will have failed to make the requisite showing of actual malice. Neutral
reportage, however, would be the sole source of constitutional protection in cases
in which the reporter knew (or should have known) that a defamatory statement
uttered in a public controversy was false and wished to publish it anyway.76
Edwards saw social value in reporting such statements simply because they were
made, but other courts and commentators have argued that neutral reportage, in
going beyond the actual-malice test, underprotects the reputational interest of
" Tune, Inc. v. Frestone, 424 U.S. 448, 456 (1976).
71 The Edwards court's statement of the neutral reportage privilege does not use the word "newsworthy."
It speaks only of "serious" charges against a "public" figure. However, the court immediately goes on
to say, "We do not believe that the press may be required under the First Amendment to suppress
newsworthy statements merely because it has serious doubts regarding their truth." 556 F.2d at 120.
E.g., Dickey v. CBS, Inc., 583 F.2d 1221 (3d Cir. 1978); Newell v. Held Enterprises, Inc., 91 m. App.
3d 735, 415 N.E.2d 434 (11I. App. Ct. 1980); Hogan v. Herald Co., 84 A.D.2d 470, 446 N.Y.S.2d 836
(1982), affd, 58 N.Y.2d 630, 444 N.E.2d 1002, 458 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1982).
73 Hogan v. Herald Co., 84 A.D.2d at 478, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 842.
' E.g., Postill v. Booth Newspapers, Inc., 118 Mich. App. 608, 325 N.W.2d 511. The case arose over
newspaper reports that a county deputy had accused the county sheriff of assaulting and threatening him
at a wedding. The court held that the press "is adequately protected" by Times. Id. at 625, 325 N.W.2d
at 518.
7' Times, 376 U.S. at 279.
76 If the statement is communicated as part of a governmental proceeding, it would enjoy common-law
protection under the privilege of fair report in jurisdictions where that doctrine is recognized, regardless
of whether plaintiffs proved there was actual malice. See infra note 157 and accompanying text
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those who become subjects of media stories and unfairly skews the balance of
interests toward media liberty and away from reputational protection."
In sum, then, three concerns must be addressed in assessing the viability of
the neutral reportage privilege as a matter of constitutional law. First, is it
incompatible with the Supreme Court's holding in Gertz? Second, if it can be
reconciled with Gertz, would its adoption represent, as a matter of public policy,
a sound extension of evolving First Amendment doctrine? Third, if so, how
should its contours be defined?
NEUTRAL REPORTAGE, NEWSWORTHINESS, AND GERTZ
A principal objection to Edwards has centered on the Second Circuit's failure
to harmonize the newly articulated neutral reportage privilege with the Supreme
Court's Gertz decision, in particular, Gertz's holding that the newsworthiness of
the publication should not be used to determine the level of First Amendment
protection under the actual malice test of Times and subsequent cases.78
Whether the Supreme Court remains steadfast in its opposition to subject-ma-
tter classifications has become an open question in recent years.79 In Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,"0 the Court establishes a test that
requires, at least in some libel cases, a judicial determination of whether the
publication involved "matters of public concern" -- a standard nearly identical to
that articulated in Rosenbloom and struck down in Gertz."1
"See, e.g, Comment, Edwards v. National Audubon Society, Inc.: A Constitutional Privilege to Republish
Defamation Should be Rejected, 33 HASIiNGS L.J. 1203 (1982); Hogan v. Herald Co., 84 A.D.2d at 478,
446 N.Y.S.2d at 842 (Edwards "upset" the balanced rights previously established by the Supreme Court
in New York Times and Gertz).
7, See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985), the Court held that in
cases involving private plaintiffs, presumed and punitive damages would be allowed if the publication
involved "no matters of public concern." Id. at 763. Professor Smolla notes that the language in Dun
& Bradstreet ("matters of public concern") is "virtually indistinguishable" from the language in
Rosenbloom ("matters of public or general interest"), which had held that the newsworthiness of the
publication would determine the degree of First Amendment protection and which Gertz explicitly
overturned. Smolla, Dun & Bradstreet, Hepps. and Liberty Lobby: A New Analytic Primer on the Future
Course of Defamation, 75 GEO. L.J. 1519, 1541 n.104 (1987). While Dun & Bradstreet was addressing
the types of damages that could be awarded and Gertz was concerned about the level of fault that must
be shown, the ruling clearly undercuts Gertz's reasoning that determinations of newsworthiness would
unduly burden trial courts. Smolla argues that Dun & Bradstreet has resurrected Rosenbloom in a fashion:
"Justice Powell's Dun & Bradstreet opinion refitted Rosenbloom for a different purpose: to contract First
Amendment protection rather than to expand it." Id. at 1541.
See also J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSrrnTIONAL LAW § 16.35, at 939 (3d Ed.
1986) ("What is clear from Dun & Bradstreet is that a majority of the Court is unhappy with the constitu-
tional law of libel as formulated in New York Times and Gertz"). Since then, one member of the majority
advocating reconsideration, Chief Justice Burger, has been replaced by Justice Kennedy.
'o 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
l Id. at 763.
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But that question need not be resolved to find that Edwards and Gertz can
co-exist as constitutional doctrine. While Gertz and Edwards are actually
speaking to different elements of a tort action -- Gertz addressing the prima facie
issue of fault and Edwards the affirmative defense of privilege to be asserted
against the prinafacie case -- two questions are central to an analysis of Gertz's
relevance to neutral reportage. First, does Gertz's disapproval of newsworthiness
as a consideration apply with equal force to all elements of the tort, including a
privilege? Second, if so, is newsworthiness an essential component of the neutral
reportage privilege? In other words, if one removes the often-cited requirement
that a subject must be newsworthy for the neutral reportage privilege to apply,
does the privilege lose its value as a potential First Amendment doctrine?
The Problems of a Newsworthiness Standard
Despite the Court's recent revival of newsworthiness as a criterion in at least
one First Amendment context,' Gertz's logic remains worthy of consideration.
Gertz, by explicit reference, incorporates the Rosenbloom dissents of Justices
Harlan and Marshall in attacking the idea that newsworthiness rather than the
public status of the plaintiff should determine when a showing of actual malice
will be required.8 3 The majority in Gertz embraces Justice Harlan's contention
that the ambiguous definition of newsworthiness would lead to "unpredictable
results and uncertain expectations" for journalists attempting to decide whether
their conduct would gain First Amendment protection, were the story to lead to
litigation. Such lack of certainty can itself lead to the very self-censorship
Times and later cases were seeking to avoid.85
Equally important, at the core of the two Rosenbloom dissents is the recogni-
tion that, despite the constitutional implications, defamation remains a tort action
and thus the rules to be applied, as a matter of logic, should speak to the conduct
of the actors.8 Because tort law encompasses not merely determinations of fault
and causality but also collective social judgments about what risks are accept-
able," the analysis of conduct must include in its scope the risks and conduct
not only of the defendant but also of the plaintiff. The message of the Gertz
majority and the Rosenbloom dissent is this: The First Amendment may require
82 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
83 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 338-39, 342-43.
4 Id. at 343.
85 See Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the "Chilling Effect," 58 B.U.L. REV.
685, 708 (1978) ("[t]he method of prevention of overcautious self-censorship must be the tolerance of
undercautious regulation").
86 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339 (noting that the two Rosenbloom dissenters endorse the idea that states should
be allowed wide freedom to continue the common-law evolution of fault standards and other elements of
the tort).
'7 Calabresi, Torts The Law of the Mixed Society, 56 TEx. L. REV. 519, 525 (1978).
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that some defamation go uncompensated, but the rules leading to that result
should not be drawn in such a way as to disregard important differences in
conduct between different types of plaintiffs.
Gertz argues that a newsworthiness standard is more likely to sweep into its
grasp -- and thereby prevent recovery to -- purely private individuals."8 These
individuals are less likely to have means of redress outside litigation (e.g., holding
press conferences and publicizing their replies to the defamation).89 Second,
fundamental to Gertz's notion of who is a public figure is some voluntary conduct
that exposes the plaintiff to the public eye.90 It follows that society can more
fairly place the burden of uncompensated defamation on public figures who have
freely assumed some risk in deciding to place themselves before the public. The
use of the "public figure" test to set the bounds of reputational protection under
the First Amendment is consistent with these concerns for fairness and assumption
of risk.
A newsworthiness standard, on the other hand, fails to address these issues
of cost and conduct (e.g., the assumption of risk and the availability of alternate
remedies). Under a newsworthiness approach, plaintiffs will be denied judicial
relief even though they neither invite public scrutiny nor have other means of
protecting their good names. And, at least in the minds of the Gertz majority, a
newsworthiness standard is more difficult to administer judicially than the public-
figure standard.9' While these problems in Gertz were raised in regard to fault
standards in the plaintiffs' prima facie case, they do not disappear when the
element under consideration is not fault but a tort privilege like neutral reportage.
Newsworthiness and Neutral Reportage
Thus, if the validity of the neutral reportage privilege depends on the
inclusion of newsworthiness in the privilege's definition, the Gertz critique would
appear to render a fatal blow. One commentator, writing in favor of the privilege,
has concluded, "The concept of newsworthiness is central to the Edwards
privilege." 92  He cites Edwards' assertions that allegations made in a public
*s Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
i9 Id. at 344.
90 Id.
9" The Court defines a public figure as a person who has pervasive influence or one who voluntarily
places himself or herself in the public spotlight. Id. at 351. While the Court apparently concludes that
defining public figures is an easier task for judges than defining newsworthiness, the problem of knowing
who is a public figure was raised sharply in Time. Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 453 (1976), in which
a socially prominent divorce litigant was held to be a private individual for purposes of her libel action.
Id. at 454.
92 Comment, Restricting the First Amendment Right to Republish Defamatory Statements, 69 GEO. L.J.
1495, 1507 (1981).
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controversy about public figures are newsworthy and that the First Amendment
should not be read to suppress newsworthy publication.93 The requirement of
newsworthiness is routinely cited in summaries of the law as an essential element
of the privilege.'
The problem is that newsworthiness was not part of the definition of the
elements of the privilege in Edwards. Judge Kaufman in stating the elements of
the privilege95 makes no reference to ncwsworthiness at all. The term is raised
for the first time in the opinion after he provides the elements, as part of his
attempt to justify the privilege's inclusion in constitutional doctrine as a matter
of public policy.96  A close reading of Edwards indicates that rather than being
an independent element to be proved as part of the privilege, newsworthiness in
this context is little more than a short-hand reference to the fact that public policy
will be served when the elements of the privilege are met and the privilege is
applied. Just as in Gertz, the court under Edwards looks to see whether the
plaintiff qualifies as a public figure. 97 While the assumption in both cases is that
media stories about public figures will be stories with public value -- i.e., they
will be newsworthy -- that is neither a necessary result nor a necessary condition
of the constitutional protection.
Barry v. Time, Inc.98 comes to a similiar conclusion, explicitly rejecting the
notion that newsworthiness is needed under Edwards.99 It holds that the claim
of neutral reportage requires not a showing of newsworthiness but merely a
showing that, first, the plaintiff is a public figure willfully involved in a public
93 Id. at 1508.
9 E.g., PRACTISING LAW INs'TuTrUe, CONs-rrrtIY1ONAL PRIVILEGE IN LBEL LAw, PLI Order No. 64-3821,
§ IX (1988) ("The elements necessary to establish the neutral reporting privilege are: (a) serious and
newsworthy charges. ... ").
95 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
96 Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120. "Succinctly stated, when a responsible, prominent organization.. .makes
serious charges against a public figure, the First Amendment protects the accurate and disinterested
reporting of those charges, regardless of the reporter's private views regarding their validity. .What is
newsworthy about such accusations is that they were made" (italics added) (citations omitted).
' The analysis of what is a public controversy under Gertz is not the equivalent of a determination of
newsworthiness. Smolla, supra note 79, at 1541. The public-controversy analysis is primarily a
consideration of whether the plaintiff, through his own conduct, thrust himself into the public eye (and
thus became a public figure for the purposes of libel law), whereas the newsworthiness analysis looks
primarily to the characteristics of the publication or broadcast itself. Id. A person may thrust himself into
the public eye and thereby meet the requirements of the public-controversy analysis under Gertz, but a
given story about him may be unnewsworthy. Under Gertz, the newsworthiness of the story is of course
irrelevant.
584 F. Supp. 1110 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
Id. at 1125. ("Contrary to the conclusion of some courts the privilege, as defined, does not call into play
the kind of ad hoc determinations of 'newsworthiness' that concerned the Gertz court.") (emphasis in
original).
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controversy (as required by Gertz) and, second, the report is accurate and
neutral.10 It may well be that a court would find the story to be lacking in
newsworthiness -- however that is defined -- but that is a decision left to editors
and readers under both Gertz and Edwards.
In the final analysis, then, Gertz and Edwards are not incompatible. Gertz's
disapproval of judicial determinations of newsworthiness is not relevant because
newsworthiness is not an essential element in the Edwards privilege. While the
validity of Edwards as constitutional doctrine requires further inquiry into First
Amendment theory, it need not be ruled out merely on the issue of newsworthin-
ess.
NEUTRAL REPORTAGE AN) FIRST AMENDMENT THEORY
Even if Supreme Court precedents do not preclude the neutral reportage
privilege, two further questions must be asked. Is it necessary to give life to the
First Amendment guarantee of press freedom? Does it provide adequate
protection for the reputation of the individuals who are subjects of the publication
or broadcast?
A libel action is the intersection of two competing rights: the constitutional
right of a free press and the common-law right of reputational protection.
Beginning with Times v. Sullivan,"" the Supreme Court recognized that the
Constitution places limits on how far the states can go in providing a remedy for
those individuals whose reputations have been harmed by a story published or
broadcast. °2 Central to that recognition is the further recognition that some
defamation must be tolerated to provide journalists with the necessary "breathing
space" 1°3 -- the freedom to err -- to exercise fully their First Amendmentliberty.1°4
Most of the Court's deliberations in the area of defamation has been aimed
at fashioning constitutional protection through the fault standard to be met by the
plaintiffs (e.g., actual malice in the case of public figures). What Edwards
proposes is that constitutional protection be supplemented not by further altering
the fault standard of the prima facie case but by recognizing a new privilege
1w Id.
' 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
'02 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342-343.
~ Id. at 342.
10 Id.
Fall, 19911
15
McCraw: Right to Republish Libel
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1992
AKRON LAW REVIEW
doctrine, to be asserted by the media defendants.1 5 As a practical matter, the
privilege's usefulness, if any, would come either in cases in which the Times-
Gertz standards did not afford protection (e.g., there was a finding of actual
malice on the part of the media defendants) or in cases in which both Times-Gertz
and the neutral reportage privilege would apply but the latter would allow for
quicker, less burdersome disposition of the litigation.
As with any attempt to ascertain whether a certain rule of law has value, this
one requires that we determine what conduct would be encouraged or discouraged
by the proposed rule, assess who will bear the costs associated with the conduct,
and evaluate whether the prompted conduct and cost distribution conform with
broader public purposes." 6
The serious flaw in the neutral reportage privilege, as currently contoured,
is its advocates' failure to define what constitutes "neutrality" -- in other words,
to define what conduct by the reporter should legitimately give rise to immunity
from libel actions. What level of reportorial diligence is required? What state of
mind? What must be published in the story? No coherent scheme for answering
these questions appears in the decisions or literature supporting the privilege.
Until that scheme is presented, and anchored in the underlying policies of the
First Amendment, the privilege remains open for abuse by journalists who can act
with actual malice under the claim of neutrality. Absent any clear standard to
govern the reporter's conduct, the privilege allows the reputational interest of
public figures in public controversies to go underprotected without providing any
reasonable guarantee that such harm will be offset by the public benefits that arise
from the advancement of First Amendment interests.
But the present deficiencies in the neutral reportage doctrine need not be
fatal. What is needed is a "reader-centered" definition of neutral reportage -- one
15 In a sense, neutrality can be seen as a variation of a fault standard in so far as it posits a type of intent
or a level of care. Dealing with it as an issue separate from actual malice, however, is not only consistent
with the way it has been handled by the courts beginning with Edwards but also underscores a basic
difference between the Times-Gertz approach and the neutral reportage concept: The former are largely
concerned with journalist's reporting conduct (e.g., decisions about whom to interview and about what)
while the latter focuses primarily on the journalist's writing conduct (e.g., decisions about what to include
in the publication and how). See infra note 154 and accompanying text.
'0 Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of 'orts: An Essayfor Harry Kalven Jr., 43 U. CHI. L REV.
69, 70 (1975) (Modem tort analysis has taken on a functional approach that asks "how the law of torts
determines what injuries are worth avoiding, how it controls what categories of people bear the burden
of those injuries that do occur and the related burden of avoiding those injuries deemed worth avoiding,
and how it serves to encourage or require the spreading of such burdens." These goals must then be
considered in terms of some concept of justice). Id. Schauer notes that the rule to be drawn need not
actually achieve its underlying purposes in every case, but that there be a probablistic connection between
the rule and the purpose. Schauer, The Second-Best First Amendment, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 9
(1989). He cites the example of the Miranda warning to criminal suspects. Although the warning may
not serve the underlying policy of protecting a suspect's rights in every instance, we believe that such a
purpose will be served in most cases. Id.
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in which the courts look at what readers could reasonably believe about the
parties mentioned in the story, based on the story itself. That approach, contrary
to the modem trend in libel litigation since Times, focuses attention not on a
reporter's conduct in gathering information (e.g., did the reporter act with actual
malice?) but on the reporter's conduct in selecting and presenting information in
the story. In short, it asks what the story said, not what the reporter did prior to
writing the story. The reader-centered approach returns the focus of libel
litigation to the often-overlooked question that should rightfully be at the center
of the tort: Did the story cause reputational harm?
By placing that question at the center of any attempt to shape a neutral
reportage privilege, one is better able to ensure that reputations will be adequately
protected while at the same time forwarding the public's legitimate interest in
knowing about public matters. Equally important, the intrusive and uncertain
inquiry into editorial decision-making that necessarily follows from the Times rule
will be substantially curtailed. A well-crafted version of the neutral reportage
privilege offers the hope of more efficient adjudication of claims and greater
certainty for media decision-makcrs who must weigh the risk of litigation.
Shaping Conduct: Actual Malice v. Neutral Reportage
The facts of Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton07 provide
a useful context for assessing both the neutral reportage privilege and the Times
approach and for understanding the particular limitations of each in their
allocation of costs and regulation of conduct. Daniel Connaughton, a Hamilton,
Ohio, lawyer, found himself in the fall of 1983 in a heated election campaign
against an incumbent judge, James Dolan.108 That September, Connaughton and
some campaign workers met with two sisters, Patsy Stephens and Alice
Thompson. Stephens claimed during the tape-recorded meeting that she had
participated in a bribery scheme involving Judge Dolan's clerk.' °9 Armed with
that information, Connaughton notified local law enforcement officials, who began
a grand jury investigation that ultimately led to bribery charges against the
clerk. 10
In early November, with the election only days away and the grand jury
investigation continuing, the local newspaper was approached by an attorney who
was representing the judge's aide and who wanted the newspaper to interview
Alice Thompson."' Thompson had testified before the grand jury and she was
'07 491 U.S. 657 (1989).
' Id. at 660.
'09 Id. at 668-69.
-1 id. at 660.
., Id. at 670.
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now claiming that candidate Connaughton had improperly offered her and her
sister a vacation and other gifts in appreciation of their role in initiating the
investigation of his opponent's office. 112 It was Thompson's charges that came
to be printed in the newspaper and prompted Connaughton's suit for defamation.
Although the newspaper interviewed Connaughton at length and published his
denials of Thompson's charges, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court's finding
that the paper acted with actual malice." 3 The Court took special note of
evidence showing that the newspaper declined to interview Thompson's sister,
Patsy Stephens, a source well-placed to assess the accuracy of Thompson's
charges against Connaughton, and refused to listen to Connaughton's tape of his
conversation with Thompson and Stephens." 4  At trial, the newspaper defen-
dant had claimed a neutral reportage privilege but the lower court ruled that the
accuser, Thompson, did not qualify as a responsible source, a requirement of the
state's neutral reportage doctrine." 5 On appeal, the newspaper chose not to
press its claim under neutral reportage." 
6
Despite Justice Blackmun's apparent sympathy with the neutral reportage
privilege in his concurrence," 7 it cannot be assumed that the Court would have
found the privilege applicable in Harte-Hanks and established it as constitutional
law. Nevertheless, the factual setting of the case suggests that the neutral
reportage is not merely coextensive with the protection of the actual malice
standard, that it may reach cases that Times and its progeny do not. In a
jurisdiction governed by Barry, which dispensed with the qualification that the
accuser be responsible,"1 the newspaper defendant in Harte-Hanks would
appear to have had a reasonably good chance of prevailing on neutral reportage
grounds. The operative question, though, is whether that result would be more
desirable, in terms of the underlying purposes of both the First Amendment and
the law of defamation, than a result holding the paper liable in this case and
similar ones." 9
It is useful to begin by looking at what kind of conduct regulation and cost
allocation takes place under libel law as it is currently constitutionalized through
the actual-malice standard. In Harte-Hanks, the Court found that the newspaper's
112 Id. at 670-72.
113 Id. at 690-92.
114 Id. at 682-83.
"' Id. at 660 n.1.
116Id.
"7 See supra notes 9 and 10 and accompanying text.
" Barry v. Time, Inc. 584 F.Supp. 1110, 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
'19 As Schauer points out, there need not be a perfect fit between the rule and the policy to be served in
every case. See supra note 106.
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conduct in gathering information was insufficient.'20 Had the newspaper taken
additional steps in its reporting (e.g., interviewing Thompson's sister and listening
to the plaintiff's tape of his meeting with the two sisters),' it conceivably
would have been immunized from the libel action. Yet it is not clear that the
story would have been so different from the one that actually ended up in print.
Connaughton's competing account of the events was already part of the story.
While the Court's majority argues that a denial from Thompson's sister "would
quickly put an end to the story,' 22 that proposition is arguable. Six witnesses--
Connaughton and five others connected to him -- had already denied Thompson's
charges in interviews with the newspaper, but the Court reasons that Thompson's
sister, as someone not allied with Connaughton, would have done what the others
did not: kill the story. 23 Yet, given the nature of the charges (that the plaintiff
was "buying off' testimony) and the fact that Thompson had already appeared
before a grand jury, the paper might reasonably conclude that her charges were
convincing enough and of enough public interest to go forward with the story.
With the election only days away, the story was unusually timely. Thus,
essentially the same story, causing essentially the same damage to reputation,
would have been published, yet, had the newspaper taken the extra steps, the
outcome of the libel litigation would have been reversed, with a decision for the
defendants. The clear lesson is that the reportorial conduct required by Times can
have little to do either with providing the public with useful information (the First
Amendment interest to be served) or with protecting reputation (the competing
conmon law interest).
In that way, Harte-Hanks is emblematic of the problem of current libel
litigation when looked at in the traditional tort terms of conduct regulation and
cost allocation. The constitutional structuring of libel litigation by Times has
typically left the malice issue as the first and primary question to be litigated2"
and may be detrimental to both plaintiffs and defendants. Research from the
Iowa Libel Project shows that plaintiffs with little chance of winning are able to
inflict a substantial financial burden on media defendants as part of discovery on
the issue of actual malice.125 On the other hand, the rules will often work to
place the full cost of actual reputational injury on an innocent plaintiff when the
media defendants can show that their conduct in reporting did not constitute
actual malice (a reckless disregard for the truth). 2 6  In short, rather than
2 491 U.S. at 691-93.
121 Id.
'2 Id. at 682.
Id. at 682-83.
' Bezanson, Libel Law and the Realities of Litigation: Setting the Record Straight. 71 IowA L Rriv. 226,
229-30 (1985).
'"Id. at 231.
'2 Id. at 229-31.
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insulating media defendants from litigation, Times and its progeny have largely
transformed the tort of libel into a forum on media conduct, reporting methods,
and editorial decision-making.
27
Those issues rarely shed light on whether First Amendment purposes were
served by the information published in the story or whether reputation has been
damaged. In Harte-Hanks, the reporters arguably could have avoided liability --
thereby shifting the costs of reputational damage to Connaughton -- by engaging
in reporting conduct that neither would have changed the published story (one
possible way in which damage to reputation could have been mitigated or
eliminated) nor would have furthered any discernible First Amendment purpose,
such as providing to readers information useful to self-government 128  Schauer
is correct in arguing that the rules governing defamation need to be drawn in such
a way as to err in favor of greater press freedom 29 and that there need not be
perfect correlation between the rule and accomplishment of the underlying
purpose in every case,'13  but libel reformers have rightfully come to doubt the
ability of the Times line of cases to guard adequately either press freedom or
reputation.1
While the neutral reportage privilege would be applicable in only a limited
number of cases -- essentially those arising from public controversies -- it offers
a strikingly different approach to the conduct and cost questions than does Times.
Rather than looking primarily at the conduct of reporters in gathering information,
as the actual-malice standard does, it shifts the focus to reporters' conduct in
presenting the information. In cases like Edwards and Barry, the court places
substantial weight on what information was actually provided to readers: e.g.,
denials and information relevant to evaluating the credibility of the parties to the
dispute.132 The value of such an approach is that the conduct required of the
defendants is directly linked to the conveyance of information to the public and
to the protection of reputation -- the two competing interests underlying the
litigation. Its rules, properly drawn, could encourage journalists to take steps that
actually increase the amount of public information and limit reputational harm
'27 Id. The Supreme Court has ruled that the Fint Amendment does not bar plaintiffs' inquiries into the
editorial process as part of discovery. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
121 Blasi proposes that First Amendment analysis has found four core values underlying the First Amend-
ment: providing for self-government, allowing individual autonomy, encouraging a check on government,
and creating a marketplace of diverse ideas. Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521.
129 See supra note 85.
130 See supra note 106.
'' E.g., Bezanson, supra note 124; Smolla & Gaertner, The Annenberg Libel Reform Proposal: The Case
for Enactment, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 25 (1989); Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?,
53 U. CIL L REV. 782 (1986).
132 Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120; Barry, 584 F. Supp. at 1127.
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(e.g., publishing competing accounts) unlike the actual-malice approach, which
frequently prompts behavior designed not so much to change the story but to
buttress a showing of no malice in anticipation of litigation (e.g., proving that the
reporter made reasonable attempts to contact a source).
The Neutral Reportage Privilege and Self-Governance
Whatever the differences in approaches between Times and Edwards, both
decisions can be justified as constitutional interpretation only to the extent that
they serve the underlying values of the First Amendment. The concern with
neutral reportage, of course, is that it allows reporters to act with reckless
disregard for the truth, as defined by Times -- more plainly, it allows them to
print allegations even if they know those allegations are false. 33 In the view
of the Second Circuit in Edwards, untrue allegations have value by the mere fact
that they were uttered.' 3 ' In a case such as Harte-Hanks, the argument would
go, voters should not be kept in the dark about the fact that allegations were
being made against a candidate about to stand for election. Several justifications
might be offered:
1. The allegations, while far-fetched to the journalists, could conceivably
contain some truth and therefore should be allowed into the public
forum. This might be especially true in cases in which minority voices
are seeking to be heard and find themselves being eliminated by the
legal judgment of journalists more attuned to majoritarian sentiments and
prejudices.
2. The allegations, while probably false, reflect on the accuser rather than
the accused and therefore help readers understand what kind of
irresponsible person the accuser is.'35
"3 Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120.
134 id.
1 This rationale apparently explains some media editors' decision to publish or broadcast dubious
accusations by contaoversial activist A] Sharpton. After Sharpton claimed former law enforcement
officials in Dutchess County, N.Y., had ties to the Irish Republican Army, a media executive was quoted
as saying: "Editors and producers should look at a piece of outrageous tape and say, "'Put it on the air.
Let our viewers see how foolish this is.'" Diamond, The Sound Bites and the Fury, N.Y. MAG. 36, 39
(March 28, 1988).
In discussing its coverage of Sen. Joseph McCarthy, The New York Times made a similar
argument: "It is difficult, if not impossible, to ignore charges by Senator McCarthy just because they are
usually proved false. The remedy lies with the reader." R. ROVERE, SENATOR JOE MCCARTHY 166(1959).
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3. The allegations, while probably false, shed light on the controversy itself
(e.g., its intensity, its viciousness, or its baseness).136
4. The allegations, while dubious, cannot be proved or disproved in a
reasonable amount of time or effort by the journalist. If true, though,
they would be of great public significance. On balance, the public is
best served by alleviating the journalist's risk of litigation (and elevating
the accused's risk of reputational damage) by allowing the allegations to
be made public.
The Supreme Court has long held that "Itihere is no constitutional value in
false statement of facts." '  Yet, under Times, false statements, when not the
product of actual malice (in cases involving public plaintiffs), have enjoyed
protection. The rationale for that result is that "overprotection" is required, lest
journalists fearing either their own error or errors on the part of juries and judges
decide not to do certain socially valuable stories."' s Neutral reportage differs,
though, in one important way: Under neutral reportage, what is being protected
is not erroneous falsity but known falsity. Advocates of neutral reportage would
appear to be arguing not that the press needs breathing space to make errors as
they pursue legitimate stories but that the falsity in and of itself has value.
If that were the case, there could be little justification for the neutral
reportage doctrine. But understanding the potential value of the privilege requires
an understanding that republication is not the same as publication. In republica-
tion cases, there are two tiers of truth or falsity. At one level is the truth or
falsity of the defamatory remark itself and, at a second level, the truth or falsity
of the report of the defamatory remark. In most neutral reportage cases, the
underlying defamatory remark may be false but the newspaper is accurate in its
report about what was said and who said it. It is the truthfulness of the latter, and
not the falsity of the former, that advocates of the privilege seek to bring under
the umbrella of First Amendment protection for purposes like those enumerated
above.
To the extent that the allegations arise in the context of a matter of legitimate
'36In defending press republication of Sen. Joseph McCarthy's dubious allegations of conmmunist influence
in government agencies, Walter Lippmann wrote: "McCarthy's charges of treason, espionage, corruption,
perversion are news which cannot be suppressed or ignored. They come from a United States senator
and a politician.. in good standing at the headquarters of the Republican Party. When he makes such
attacks against the State Department and the Defense Department, it is news which has to be published."
R. RovERE, SENATOR JOE MCCARMY 166 (1959).
3 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
'3 Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the "Chilling Effect," 58 B.U.L. REV. 685,
707 (1978).
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public concern,139 protection of the media's right to republish them accurately
would seem to be consistent with the First Amendment's core value of self-
government, as articulated by Meiklejohn.14 0 In Greenbelt Cooperative Publish-
ing Association, Inc. v. Bresler,'4' the Court was confronted with a libel action
aising from the republication of a citizen's use of the term "blackmail" at a
public meeting to describe the activities of a local real estate developer. 42
While the Court found for the defendant on other grounds, 43 Professor Blasi
has written: "One would think that an accurate report of what transpired at a city
council meeting would be a paradigm case for protection under the Meiklejohn
theory despite the common-law adage that 'tale-bearers are as bad as tale-
makers.""" Meiklejohn himself distinguishes between a verbal attack on a
private businessman and the same verbal attack on a political candidate: "If,
however, the same verbal attack is made in order to show the unfitness of a
candidate for governmental office, the act is properly regarded as a citizen's
participation in government. lt is, therefore, protected by the First Amend-
ment."'
4
While the precise boundaries of self-government may be unclear, its
extension to public controversies outside official governmental activity via the
neutral reportage privilege would appear to be in keeping both with the realities
of modem American political life and with the Supreme Court's view of the self-
government concept during the formative years of the Times doctrine.' Even
more clearly within the bounds of self-government is a case like Connaughton's,
one involving the fitness of a candidate for public office.
To the extent that the Times-Gertz protection does not reach republication of
defamatory allegations important to self-government, the core value of the First
Amendment is frustrated in two ways. First, the press is less likely to share with
its public the substance of the controversy and perhaps the controversy itself.
Second, those who wish to publicize allegations that have some utility but may
'" Accordingly, Edwards limited its use to public controversies involving public figures. Edwards v.
National Audubon Society, Inc., 556 F.2d 113, 120 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1002 (1977).
4' For a discussion of self-government as the underlying purpose of the First Amendment and of Times
v. Sullivan, see A. MEIIEjOHN, PoLmcAL FREEOM (1960); Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note
on "the Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. Cr. REV. 191,203; Brennan, The Supreme
Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment," 79 HARv. L REV. 1 (1965).
' 398 U.S. 6 (1970).
'4Id. at 7.
'0 Id. at 9-11, 14.
'4 Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amenulment Theory, 1977 Am. B. FouND. RES. J. 521,570 (1977).
4s Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Avolute, 1961 SuP. Cr. REV. 245, 259.
'46 "Self-governance in the United States presupposes far more than knowledge and debate about the
strictly official activities of various levels of governmenL" Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29,
41(1971).
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be only partially true or simply unverifiable may not have effective alternative
means of placing their message before the public. In media-intense polities,
republication by established media outlets may be the sole effective channel.
Thus, the additional protection provided by a neutral reportage privilege would
appear to advance the precise interests Times v. Sullivan sought to further, if both
the controversy and the defamatory viewpoint are indeed relevant to self-
government.
Even in cases like Edwards in which the actual-malice standard would
provide grounds for finding for the defendant, neutral reportage would nonetheless
be valuable in that it would allow courts to more quickly dispose of claims at the
pre-trial stage or by summary judgment early in the proceedings.4 7 Avoidance
of costly litigation, in and of itself, serves the purposes set forth in Times by
reducing the fear of liability that often prompts self-censorship.
48
Neutral Reportage Privilege and Reputation Protection
Protection of First Amendment liberty, however, is not the sole touchstone
of constitutional litigation in the area of defamation. As the Gertz majority wrote:
"If it were, this Court would have embraced long ago the view that publishers and
broadcasters enjoy an unconditional and indefeasible immunity from liability for
defamation. ,149 In Edwards, the Second Circuit held that society's interest in
protecting against reputational harm was served by publishing the denials of the
accused.150  If Harte-Hanks were to be considered as a neutral reportage case,
similiar denials from Connaughton would be offered as providing the required
balance.
Examined from the perspective of cost allocation and conduct regulation, the
notion that mere publication of a denial is adequate reputational protection is
troubling. Whatever the limitations of the actual-malice approach, it nevertheless
forces reporters to engage in conduct designed to elicit the truth. When false
stories that damage a reputation are published, and there is no finding of actual
malice, the cost of the reputational damage is shifted in its entirety to the plaintiff,
but only after the reporter has been required, by the operation of the actual-malice
standard, to engage in at least marginally responsible conduct. No equivalent
tradeoff is present under neutral reportage as defined by Edwards. Soliciting
denials from the person under attack not only requires little reportorial initiative
but in effect shifts the behavioral burden to the person whose reputation is on the
',7 Bowles, supra note 17, at 16.
",, Srnolla & Gaertner, supra note 131, at 31.
149 Gertz, 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (citations omitted).
130 Edwards v. National Audubon Society, Inc., 556 F.2d 113, 120 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1002 (1977).
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line. It is up to that person to provide a denial, no matter how absurd the
charges. One needs only to recall the anti-Communist witch hunts of the 1950s
to envision the sort of abuse such a rule could sanction.
Equally important, it is difficult to assert that the mere publication of denials
leads to a story that can actually be characterized as a truthful republication.
Under the Edwards scheme, a story could present the two sides as having equally
valid claims (the charges on the one side and the denials on the other) and qualify
for legal immunity. Yet such a story would seem to be, on its face, deceptive if
those claims do not in fact have equal validity. If a highly plausible denial is
presented as nothing more than an equally meritorious alternative to a highly
unlikely accusation, the story cannot fairly be said to be true, at least as far as the
truth is known to the reporter. If the Edwards rule leads neither to truth nor to
conduct that is socially valuable despite the falsity of the story, as is the case with
Times, then the reputational injury to the plaintiff is unjustly denied remedy.
Edwards attempted to provide reputational protection, in part, by requiring
that the accuser be a "responsible" and "prominent" organization. 51  In Barry,
on the other hand, the federal district court found no basis in the Constitution or
in logic for limiting the privilege to organizations.'52 The court there preferred
to forgo any standard of accuser trustworthiness.1 53 The Barry decision gives
weight to the fact that the magazine defendant included both the denials of the
plaintiff and information casting doubt on the credibility of the quoted accus-
er.154 In essence, the court sees inclusion of those items as indications of the
defendant's neutrality, as required by the Edwards standard.1
55
This second approach by Barry, which delineates the privilege in terms of
what the defendant publication actually presented to readers, begins to move
toward a more sensible approach to the privilege than requiring the reporter to
determine whether an accuser is responsible or trustworthy. The "responsible
accuser" standard would not only necessitate a sometimes difficult judicial
assessment of how the reporter evaluated the accuser (and perhaps whether that
assessment was reasonable), but also would work counter to First Amendment
purposes by assuming that only trustworthy accusers' accusations are of value to
self-government. It is not hard to imagine a newspaper well-serving its readers
by discussing the harassing charges made against a public figure by a fringe
group with no claim to responsibility. On the other hand, the "responsible
accuser" requirement may deny unpopular minority voices access to media
" Id.
152 Bany v. Time, Inc. 584 F. Supp. 1110, 1125 n.18 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
-3 Id. at 1127.
15 Id.
15 id.
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channels by a broad judicial stroke painting them as irresponsible.
Any doctrine attempting to extend the media's protection against libel actions
will come at a cost to those whose reputations are injured. That can be justified
either by showing that the doctrine will encourage conduct that, on balance, has
greater social value than the reputational protection foregone -- the rationale of
Times -- or by mitigating the injury. Because the neutral reportage privilege
would work independently of the Times standard, it would provide protection to
reporters who acted with actual malice, that is, reporters who believed or knew
the allegation was false -- including those who simply chose not to follow leads
that could have assisted in determining the truthfulness of the allegation. That
result is unacceptable unless an incentive for some other socially valuable conduct
or injury mitigation is built into the rule. Edwards saw the value of republication
of the defamation arising not from the possibility that the accusation might be true
but from the public's legitimate interest in being fully informed that a controversy
exists.156 Thus, requiring full presentation of the statement's context is essential
both to encouraging socially valuable conduct in the way journalists present the
information and, primarily, to mitigating the harm of the publication.
More specifically, a well-tailored neutral reportage privilege would require
more than inclusion of denials and a clear indication to the readers that the
statements are unilateral accusations, not established facts. It would also
accurately reflect the reporter's knowledge about the validity of the accusations
in areas such as the absence of proof, evidence casting doubts on the credibility
of the accuser, and facts illuminating the accuser's perspective such as political
affiliations or previous differences with the accused. In short, neutral reportage
should not mean mindless neutrality, but instead fair, full, and accurate accounting
not only of the allegation but also of the allegation's context.
If the concern of libel law is really protection of reputation, as it should be,
then the operative fact is how any given publication changed the opinions of
readers toward the plaintiff. The damage, if any, from defamation arises from the
words published and read, not from the pre-publication conduct of the alleged
tortfeasor. The relevant evidence, then, should primarily be found in the
publication itself and not in the information-gathering conduct of the reporter
prior to publication. The question to be asked by the media decision-maker at the
time of publication, and by the court at the time of adjudication, is: Did the story
reasonably put readers on notice that the disputed allegations were not assertions
of truth by the newspaper and should not be read as such? If that test is met, the
cost of reputational injury, if any, is fairly shifted from the media defendant to the
plaintiff.
Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120.
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This reader-centered approach, with its concern for the context of the
allegation,' achieves several purposes. First, it strengthens the republisher's
claim that the report of the allegation is true, even if the allegation itself is not,
and thus brings it more comfortably into First Amendment protection. Second,
it places a greater burden for reputational protection on the reporters, who are in
a better position to bring about that protection than the accused. Third, it more
clearly defines the conduct that reporters should engage in consistent with the
public purposes to be served.
Neutral reportage so construed would actually provide those accused with
more protection than the law affords them under the common law doctrine of fair
report. 58 Under fair report, an accusation made in a governmental forum is
protected as long as it is republished accurately. The fair report privilege is not
encumbered by any requirement that denials be included or that the source of the
accusation be responsible. 59  The danger implicit in that privilege has been
widely discussed in the case of Sen. Joseph McCarthy, whose unsubstantiated
attacks on individuals during Senate proceedings were disseminated by the media
under the fair report privilege.' 6° (The fair-report privilege, although widely
accepted as a matter of statute or common law, has not been elevated to
constitutional doctrine by the Supreme Court. 6 1)
It is also useful to compare the neutral reportage's reputational protection to
that provided under the Supreme Court's decisions in the Times line of cases.
First, both set a higher degree of protection for private plaintiffs than for those
in the public spotlight, Times by allowing them to win on a finding of negligence
rather than actual malice'62 and neutral reportage by limiting its protection of
the press to cases involving public figures.'63
"5 See infra note 174 and accompanying text.
'5' See Sowle, supra note 33.
9 "Generally stated, the common-law rule of fair report permits the privileged publication of (1) the
public proceedings of governmental bodies, (2) which are fairly and accurately reported, (3) in good faith
and without malice or intent to harm, and (4) which report official activity." (citations omitted). Hogan
v. Herald Co., 84 A.D.2d at 477, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 841.
'60 See R. ROVERE, SENATOR JOE MCCARTHY 162-70 (1959) for a discussion of McCarthy's manipulation
of the press.
" See Sowle, supra note 33. Neutral reportage may be viewed as sharing some of the same policy
underpinnings as the privilege of fair report. Fair report has sometimes been justified on what Sowle calls
the supervisory rationale (the public must have means to oversee the decisions of governmental officials)
or the agency rationale (the press is merely the eyes and ears of the public, which has the right to be
present at the proceedings). Id. at 483-487. Neither would typically apply in neutral reportage, which
envisions accusations made in less-structured, non-official forums. However, Sowle also proposes a
rationale that would extend to cover both the fair report and neutral reportage principles: the informational
rationale (the public has a legitimate interest in obtaining information important to functioning of society).
Id.
'" See supra notes 57-61.
16 See supra note 23.
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Second, the way litigation has come to be structured when the Times
standard is invoked tends to downplay the crucial issue of whether actual
reputational harm has been done. Because the operation of the actual-malice
standard shifts judicial attention to the reporting conduct of the journalists prior
to publication, inquiry into what was actually disseminated in the defendant's
story and whether reputational damage actually occurred receives scant atten-
tion.' 6' It is common under Times, then, that a story contains false and
defamatory statements but the publication is not actionable because actual malice
cannot be proved. Is reputational harm caused by mere negligence any less
damaging than that caused by reckless disregard for the truth, for instance? Yet
in the latter case there will be compensation and in the former there will not,
suggesting that when core First Amendment values comparable to those present
in Times are served, the law will place relatively little weight on reputational
protection.' 65 To the degree that the neutral reportage privilege serves those
values,' 66 its failure to provide more extensive protection to a public figure's
reputation should not prohibit its acceptance as constitutional doctrine.
In summary, neutral reportage, properly tailored, also helps move libel
litigation back to the issues that should logically be central to plaintiffs action:
Was harm done? Can the cause of that harm be reasonably traced to the words
published or broadcast?' 67  Where the actual-malice approach often raises
difficult evidentiary issues about reporters' conduct prior to publication 168 and
opens the door for extensive judicial second-guessing of editorial decisions,
neutral reportage focuses judicial attention on the most obvious evidence: the
words of the story itself. More important, it raises serious questions about
whether the story can be said to be defamatory at all. If the requirements of the
privilege are met, and the story has clearly indicated to the reasonable reader that
the accusations should not be read as assertions of truth, the claim of defamatory
harm becomes impossible to sustain. The journalists have taken the necessary
steps to assure that no reasonable reader would accept the allegations as fact. If
the story is nonetheless read as such, the cost for that unreasonable reading can
justly be placed on the accused. With the reporters having engaged in the
socially desired conduct, and with First Amendment interests having been served,
to hold the journalists liable all the same would be to work counter to public
purposes underlying the rules.
'6 See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
'6 See supra note 85.
'66 See supra notes 140-46.
6 "[Mhe legitimate function of libel law must be understood as that of compensating individuals for
actual, measurable harm caused by the conduct of others." Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29,
66 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
"a See supra note 125.
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TOWARD A READER-CENTERED DEFINITION OF THE PRIVILEGE
In summary, the neutral reportage privilege would appear to serve the core
values of the First Amendment, offer adequate protection to reputational interests,
and provide an effective alternative to litigation based on the fault standard of
Times v. Sullivan and its progeny. Its utility, however, depends on carefully
defining its elements and its reach. A review of case law shows that there are
four basic elements that need to be delineated: (1) the nature of the plaintiff, (2)
the nature of the accuser, (3) the nature of the subject-matter, and, most
important, (4) definition of "neutrality" as it applies to the media defendant.
169
Nature of the plaintiffs
Edwards held that the privilege should apply only in cases in which the
plaintiffs are public figures. That requirement has been consistenly upheld, offers
reputational protection to those who do not voluntarily involve themselves in
public matters, and is consistent with Supreme Court jurisprudence from Times
on.
Nature of the accuser
Edwards held that the accuser must be a responsible organization, but Barry
and other decisions raise valid questions about both the requirement that the
accuser be an organization and the value of the "responsibility" qualification.17 °
Rather than involving courts and media decision-makers in determinations of
which accusers are responsible and which are not,1 1 the legitimate concern that
trivial or frivolous charges will be republished with immunity is better served by
requiring a fair, full, and accurate presentation of the controversy, as discussed
below. Provided that other elements of the privilege are met, republication of an
accusation made about a public figure in the course of a public controversy
should fall within the bounds of the privilege, regardless of the accuser's status.
Nature of the subject-matter
This Article has argued that the often-cited requirement that the subject-
matter be "newsworthy" should be abandoned. 72 If the plaintiff is a public
figure as defined by Gertz,173 the privilege should be applicable. The effect of
Gertz would be to extend use of the privilege to all controversies involving
169 See supra notes 42-50 and accompanying text.
'70 See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
171 Id.
172 See supra notes 84-104 and accompanying text for rationale.
I" See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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pervasive public figures and to those in which private individuals have voluntarily
placed themselves in a public forum.
By its very terms, the privilege applies only to controversies, and courts have
held that the controversy must be pre-existing and not the creation of the
journalist's reportorial enterprise. 7 4 It could be argued that the information is
either relevant to self-governance or it is not, and therefore the means by which
it is generated should not matter constitutionally. That rationale fails to take into
account the underlying policy of neutral reportage. The privilege is designed to
free journalists to report accusations not because the accusations themselves have
value but because they are part of a controversy and knowledge of the controver-
sy serves a public purpose. If the controversy is not extant, the value of the
report must arise from the accusations themselves, in which case the rules set
forth by Times and its progeny are better able to strike the proper balance
between reportorial conduct and reputational protection.
Defining neutrality
The Times-Gertz line of cases, because of their concern with fault,
necessarily focuses on the question: What did the reporter know and do? The
better question, at least for cases involving media republication of accusations,
may be: What could the reader reasonably believe, based on the story?
As Justice Blackmun's concurrence in Harte-Hanks notes, and Edwards
implies, there is a significant difference between reporting that X was alleged by
someone to have happened and reporting that X actually happened.' It
follows, then, that a primary consideration should be how the allegation was
presented to the public, whether as a disputed allegation made by an identifiable
party with known interests or as a factual assertion implicitly endorsed by the
republisher. Because the concern of libel law is rightfully the protection of
reputation, the first-order question should be whether the publication changed the
opinions of readers toward the plaintiff. Whatever damage accrues from any
defamation accrues from the words published and read, not from the reporting
conduct of the alleged tortfeasor. The relevant evidence, then, should primarily
be found in the publication itself and not in the reporter's conduct in gathering
information for the story.
The term "neutral reportage" in itself is a problem. It suggests that a kind
of mindless neutrality -- in which both sides of a controversy are treated equally
'44 See supra notes 48-49.
"' Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 695 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Blackmun argues that the publication of
the denials and clear indication that the charges are not bare assertions of truth are relevant to a finding
that media defendants lack actual malice. Id. They would also appear to be relevant to a finding of
neutrality under the neutral reportage doctrine.
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regardless of their comparative merit -- is required either in the reporter's state
of mind or in the story's presentation of the accusations. Implicit in the earlier
discussion of story presentation176 is the argument that what is required is not
neutral reportage but fair, full, and accurate reportage. Moreover, the relevant
inquiries should focus not on the reporter's state of mind but on the publication
itself.
What should be required of journalists seeking the protection of the privilege
is full disclosure of the context of the accusation, including such relevant factors
as the absence of proof, evidence reflecting on the credibility of the accuser, the
existence of a controversy, denials by the accused, and facts shedding light on the
accuser's perspective and biases. While no bright line test is possible, the
determinative question should be: Did the story reasonably put readers on notice
that the disputed allegations were not assertions of truth by the publication 1
77
and should not be read as such? If that test is met, the cost of any reputational
injury that may accrue can fairly be shifted from the media defendant to the
plaintiff.
By conditioning the privilege in terms of what actually appeared in the
publication, the courts can avoid many of the problems of discovery presented by
Times' focus on the conduct of the journalists prior to publication. 17  More-
over, by spelling out more explicitly what the media must do in presenting the
story to enjoy the benefits of the doctrine, the law reduces the media's uncertainty
about liability, thereby diminishing the likelihood of self-censorship, the very evil
Times set out to attack. At the same time, by focusing on what readers could
reasonably believe based on the story published, the neutral reportage doctrine can
provide safeguards to reputation and arguably more protection than is required
under the actual-malice approach of Times.
179
Thus, a well-tailored articulation of the neutral reportage privilege should
explicitly concern itself with what the reader is told, in what context, and in what
form. Such a "reader-centered" definition of the neutral reportage principle will
most likely strike a balance between reputational interests and media liberty.
176 See supra notes 147-54 and accompanying text.
'7 It's important to separate the republisher's case and the original accuser's case. Even if the neutral
reportage privilege protected the paper, the plaintiff would retain a right of action against the accuser.
17 See supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text. Of course, there may be tines where an absence of
good faith on the part of the media defendant (e.g., the repetition is part of a pattern of harassment) may
necessitate judicial inquiry into the journalists' conduct in a neutral reportage case, but those instances
would seem to be rare.
"9 See supra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
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